would remove federal court jurisdiction over claims involving same-sex marriage, the right to privacy, and state and local restrictions of free exercise or establishment of religion, but this bill is still in committee. However, because of the importance of the constitutional interests threatened by these attempts, and the prospect that Congress might someday enact such a law, 10 these proposals have stimulated an intense academic debate over the extent to which Congress may curtail the jurisdiction of federal courts, taking into account textual, doctrinal, historical, and policy considerations.
11
These discussions have usually focused on isolated analyses of clauses in Article III of the Constitution, 12 and many theorists approach jurisdiction stripping primarily (if not solely) as a separationof-powers issue. 13 Besides proffering arguments based in the Constitution's text, those who believe that Congress has broad jurisdictionstripping powers often justify their interpretations by contending that such powers serve as a majoritarian check on a countermajoritarian judiciary.
14 Opponents of jurisdiction-stripping proposals respond 1830 congressional legislation was introduced which proposed to eliminate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions . . . .").
9 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at § 3.1, at 176-77 ("Congress rarely has attempted such jurisdiction stripping [for substantive topics]and never in a manner that has been interpreted as precluding all Supreme Court review . . . ."); cf. Sager, supra note 4, at 19 ("The judiciary has never had the occasion to rule decisively on such incursions into federal jurisdiction . . . ."). 10 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1499, 1500-01 (1990) (noting the importance of considering the jurisdiction-stripping issue even when there is no real, current threat of such a law being enacted).
11 See Clinton, supra note 8, at 748 (noting that, while some academic literature has focused on the history of Article III, "the bulk of the writing in this field has been devoted to more current doctrinal and policy considerations"). 12 See id. at 749 ("The debates over congressional power to curtail federal court jurisdiction generally have centered around the interpretation of particular clauses in article III taken in isolation."). 13 See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of "Congress" to Attack the "Jurisdiction" of "Federal Courts," 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1413 (2000) (finding that federalcourt theorists traditionally treat jurisdiction stripping as a separation-of-powers issue between the legislative and judicial branches of government). See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.1, at 175 ("The scope of Congress's power to define federal court jurisdiction focuses attention on separation of powers and the allocation of power among the branches of the federal government."); Amar, supra note 10, at 1500 (" [T] he basic separation of powers issue . . .
[is] how much power to restrict federal jurisdiction does the Constitution give Congress?"); Sager, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that Congressional jurisdiction-stripping bills constitute "one of the most serious threats ever directed toward the independent authority of the federal judiciary").
14 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 187 ("Supporters of proposals to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction under the 'exceptions and regulations' clause argue that such congressional power is an essential democratic check on the power of an unelected judiciary."); see also Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the with their own textual arguments, supported by structural arguments that, by restricting federal court jurisdiction, Congress would be impermissibly weakening judicial independence and contravening the judiciary's proper role in our tripartite system of federal governmentthat of interpreting the Constitution and protecting constitutional rights.
15
Arguments on both sides are pertinent and well founded, making the separation-of-powers perspective on the jurisdiction-stripping debate compelling.
Yet jurisdiction-stripping laws would not, ipso facto, reverse Supreme Court decisions or dictate a required judicial construction of substantive law; 16 rather, state courts would remain to resolve the particular claims affected. 17 As a result, Congress's constitutional power to limit federal court jurisdiction could be viewed by proponents not only as a majoritarian check on the judiciary, but also as a function of our federalist system. That is, such power allows Congress to delegate judicial resolution of particular issues to the courts of the states rather than those of the federal government. sional curtailment of federal court jurisdiction could be viewed by opponents as violative of not only the proper separation of powers in our federal government, but also nationalist principles of federal supremacy that would militate against allowing states to be the final arbiters of federal-and in particular, constitutional-law. From this perspective, the jurisdiction-stripping debate implicates the same competing concerns of federalism and nationalism that arise in other conflicts of constitutional law, notably the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. While the Court has recognized a constitutionally protected sovereign immunity for states based on principles of federalism and state dignity, 19 it has tempered the effect of that interpretation with a counteracting nationalist strain of law under Ex parte Young. 20 This strain requires the availability of a federal forum in certain cases against state officials in order to uphold the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
21
There is a striking similarity between the issues involved in analyzing sovereign immunity and jurisdiction stripping: in both cases, a federal forum for the vindication of federal or constitutional rights may be threatened; both bars are somewhat jurisdictional; and the sides of each debate generally correspond to ideologies of modern federalism and nationalism. 22 Further, many suits that would be barred in federal court if Congress were to restrict jurisdiction over a substantive issue are suits that are already partially barred by current sovereign immunity doctrine but given life under the Young exception. Plaintiffs who would normally be able to sue state officials in federal court for alleged constitutional violations under the Young exception 23 the jurisdiction-stripping law, even though the same pressing concerns that underlie the Young doctrine would remain. The similarities between the interests implicated by these two areas of constitutional debate make an analysis of sovereign immunity jurisprudence relevant in a discussion of jurisdiction stripping, 24 and may weigh in favor of recognizing a constitutional limitation on Congress's jurisdictionstripping power based in the Supremacy Clause, much as Young serves a similar purpose for circumventing states' sovereign immunity.
Given the Supreme Court's current federalist momentum, it is possible that the Court might approach a jurisdiction-stripping law largely as a question of judicial federalism-the proper role of state and federal courts within the dual-court system 25 -and interpret Article III as allowing Congress essentially to divert substantive issues to state courts. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle that our "system of federalism" is one "in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law"; 26 if the Court looks at a jurisdiction-stripping law from this perspective-viewing state courts as competent and appropriate to hear cases involving federal questions-the Court is unlikely to find within Article III any strong limits on Congress's power to restrict federal court jurisdiction. 27 Considering the increased prominence of federalist principles under the current Court and the implications this may have for Congress's power to restrict federal court jurisdiction, a new examination of jurisdiction stripping from a federalist perspective, tempered by its counteracting nationalist principle, is appropriate. 24 See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1430 (analyzing sovereign immunity cases and concluding that "cases in which the Court has addressed the availability of a judicial forum are obviously relevant to an examination of Congress's court-stripping powers"). 25 the more important actor in stripping the lower courts of power, it is unlikely that the current Court could or would find strong constitutional limits on the power of Congress to do so.").
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CURTAIL FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

A. The Traditional Theory of Jurisdiction Stripping
The debate over jurisdiction stripping has traditionally isolated two areas of federal jurisdiction for analysis: the jurisdiction (both original and appellate) of lower federal courts and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 28 The details of federal court jurisdiction are sketched in Article III of the Constitution, and the clauses therein have appropriately drawn the lion's share of academic discussion. 29 Section 1 states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," institutes life tenure for federal judges, and prohibits diminution of their pay while in office. 30 The scope of this "judicial Power" is described in the first clause of Section 2, which states that the power "shall extend" to the cases and controversies specified within the clause, including "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, The traditional interpretation of Article III, advanced by those who support extensive congressional ability to limit jurisdiction, is that the maximum possible extent of federal court power is represented by the "judicial Power" laid out in Section 2, Clause 1, and Congress may distribute that power as it sees fit, even if that means removing jurisdiction altogether 34 (with the exception of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction). 35 Because Congress is not required to establish the lower federal courts at all, but rather "may from time to time ordain and establish" 36 them, Congress can define the jurisdiction of those courts however it wishes.
37
The textual basis for Congress's ability to restrict Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is perhaps even more explicit, as the Constitution grants such jurisdiction to the Court "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
38 Those who believe Congress has broad jurisdiction-stripping powers view this as an explicit, unqualified grant of congressional power to eliminate Su- 32 Id. § 2, cl. 2. 33 Proponents of this interpretation support their textual argument by contending that such congressional control is necessary to provide a majoritarian check on a countermajoritarian judiciary. 41 Without this control, the argument goes, the democratically elected representatives of the people would be left little power to rein in the excesses of unelected judges, which is antithetical to the majoritarian principles upon which our republic is built. Congressional restriction of federal court jurisdiction also allows the state courts to serve a legitimate function in the federalist system, in that they are fully competent to decide issues of federal or constitutional law.
B. Arguments in Favor of Limiting Congressional Power over Jurisdiction
Persuasive arguments have been made, however, to counter the traditional interpretation in an attempt to prevent Congress from curtailing federal court jurisdiction. 43 One set of arguments looks to the wording and structure of Article III to find mandatory federal court jurisdiction beyond the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Justice Story, in dictum in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, first pointed out that the text of Article III distinguished between two different categories of jurisdiction and argued that Congress was obligated to establish lower 39 There is no similar exceptions-and-regulations clause in the Constitution for the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1597 ("Article III expressly made the appellate jurisdiction subject to Congress's power to make exceptions, but gives no such power to limit the original jurisdiction."). 40 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 177 ("The claim is that the unambigu- 43 See Velasco, supra note 34, at 678-96 (discussing comprehensively, though rejecting, arguments to limit congressional power over federal court jurisdiction).
federal courts "to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognisance." 44 Several scholars have since have launched other arguments for mandatory views of Article III jurisdiction. Some contend, like Justice Story, that the establishment of the lower federal courts is required, despite the language of Article III which is seemingly permissive, rather than mandatory, on this point. 45 Others argue that, although lower federal courts are not required, all cases and controversies included under the judicial power in Article III must ultimately be heard by some federal court, and thus if there were no inferior federal courts, the claims would need to be heard by the Supreme Court on appeal.
46
A significant problem with these mandatory views of federal jurisdiction is that they are weakened by history, particularly the failure of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to fully vest the Article III judicial power in federal courts. 47 In fact, significant jurisdictional exceptions remained in place for a century or more. These types of cases fall within the Article III judicial power yet have historically been excluded by Congress from federal court jurisdiction.
Supreme Court precedent has also supported Congress's power to curtail federal lower-court jurisdiction, at least in certain cases. 53 While there are certainly intriguing arguments that favor those who defend mandatory federal court jurisdiction over all cases within the Article III judicial power, the proponents of these theories are significantly disadvantaged by history.
Professor Amar has looked even further into the text of Article III, arguing that the use of the term "all" before the subject-based categories of cases in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 requires Congress to vest jurisdiction for all of those cases in some federal court. He concludes that Congress can only limit the jurisdiction of the types of cases that 49 The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court cases involving:
[T]he validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789); see also Fallon, supra note 17, at 1220 n.360 (noting that under the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state cases "was limited to cases in which a state court rejected a claim of federal right" an almost unseemly enthusiasm in discussing Congress' power to lop off diverse heads of the Court's article III jurisdiction."); sources cited supra note 37 (suggesting that Congress has plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction).
do not have this modifier. 54 Amar's argument avoids several of the pitfalls of prior views of mandatory federal court jurisdiction. While it is perhaps the best comprehensive mandatory theory to date, his argument has been challenged on several fronts, most notably its incongruity with the 1789 Judiciary Act, 55 a charge that Amar strongly disputes. 56 Another set of arguments concedes that the text of the Constitution gives Congress power to remove federal court jurisdiction but contends that other factors external to the text of Article III limit this power. Preeminent among these structural arguments is the assertion that the Supreme Court serves "essential functions" in the constitutional plan by maintaining the supremacy of federal law and uniformity in its application, and that Congress cannot curtail federal court jurisdiction in a way that would limit these functions.
57
The fundamental problem with the "essential functions" theory is that it has not been strongly rooted in constitutional text and fails to explain why the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal court jurisdiction in a way that did not promote uniformity of law.
58
A more holistic approach looks to other constitutional rights and provisions, noting that any jurisdiction-stripping bill must be constitutionally valid not only under Article III, but under other constitutional provisions as well. 59 For example, it is obvious that a bill taking federal jurisdiction away from a case filed by any member of a particular race 54 See Amar, supra note 44, at 240 ("[A]lthough the judicial power must extend to all cases in the first three categories, [modified by the word "all"] it may, but need not, extend to all cases in the last six. The choice . . . in the latter set of cases seems to be given to Congress . . . ."). 55 ers "are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution"); Sager, supra note 4, at 37 ("[W]hen Congress undertakes to limit jurisdiction, it is fully bound by the constitutional limitations that ordinarily constrain its behavior.").
would be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. 60 Similarly, even in less extreme cases, Congress's ability to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts must comply with due process concerns, among other constitutional protections. Supreme Court precedent supports this argument: in United States v. Klein, 61 the Court struck down a jurisdiction-stripping law because the law abridged the President's pardon power under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. 62 Some scholars therefore contend that congressional curtailment of federal court jurisdiction solely for substantive political issues would run afoul of one or more constitutional provisions, arguing, for example, that the jurisdictional law would be enacted with a motive to cause an unconstitutional result. 63 These arguments are grounded in the correct foundation that the jurisdictional law itself cannot violate any other constitutional provisions. However, the applicability of this argument to most jurisdiction-stripping proposals is questionable, in that most proposals would be facially neutral regarding a constitutional right. 64 Although the proposals may be intended to allow state courts to rule differently than a federal court, it would be difficult to establish improper legislative motive. 65 For example, the laws could be attributed legitimate justifications, such as delegating review to state courts as part of their legitimate role in the federal system. Since state courts are presumed competent to hear issues of federal or constitu- tional law, it is not clear that relegating particular issues to exclusive state court resolution can be presumed to direct a particular outcome.
C. Views of the Constitution's Framers and Ratifiers
Despite 69 Gunther, supra note 8, at 906; see Clinton, supra note 8, at 753-54 (discussing how the Madisonian Compromise sought to achieve uniformity by allowing review of federal issues by federal judges who "were constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence"); Ratner, supra note 8, at 161-62 (recognizing among the constitutional framers an "explicit assumption that the Supreme Court would exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments" where there were no inferior courts). 70 Amar, supra note 44, at 249.
The debates during the ratification of the Constitution also demonstrated a general assumption among the supporters of the Constitution that Congress did not have unlimited power to limit federal court jurisdiction. As Professor Clinton has shown, the federalist defenders of the Constitution, in response to antifederalist attacks on the expansiveness of Article III judicial power, consistently stressed the importance of federal court jurisdiction as essential to guarantee federal supremacy. 71 In The Federalist No. 82, Alexander Hamilton, discussing whether the Supreme Court could hear appeals from state supreme courts, wrote that an appeal would certainly lie from [State courts hearing federal question cases based on concurrent jurisdiction], to the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . Either this must be the case or the local courts must be excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of national concern, else the judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these consequences ought, without evident necessity, to be involved; the latter would be entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some of the most important and avowed purposes of the proposed government, and would essentially embarrass its measures. . . . The courts of the [states] will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the rules of national decisions.
72
Hamilton continued by remarking that "[t]he evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union." 73 Hamilton's writings evince a firm belief that "matters of national concern" must, under the constitutional plan, be heard ultimately in a federal court-a belief evidently rooted in concerns of federal supremacy. 74 How, then, can this evidence be squared with the traditional argument that Congress is free to suspend this important element of constitutional structure as the political tides change? Professor Melt-71 See Clinton, supra note 8, at 810-28 (analyzing the statements of constitutional ratifiers regarding the scope of the federal judicial power).
72 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 253-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966). 73 Id. at 254. 74 Id. By "specified classes," Hamilton could be interpreted to be referring to all categories of Article III power. However, given his other arguments, he appears to be referring to the classes he has specified in his writings-that is, "matters of national concern" or "national decisions."
zer notes the discontinuity between history and the positions on both sides of the debate. Those who argue that Congress cannot impede the Supreme Court's "essential role" in upholding the supremacy of federal law, or who find mandatory jurisdiction rooted in Article III, have failed to identify a textual basis in the Constitution that meshes with the historical evidence. Yet supporters of jurisdiction-stripping proposals "must assign great weight to the exceptions clause, which was rather inconspicuous in the constitutional debate," and also have difficulty addressing the evidence that the framers intended a strong role for the federal judiciary as essential to the constitutional plan.
75
The preceding discussion sets up two basic propositions that must be harmonized. First, based on the long history of jurisdictional restrictions, Congress has some power, stemming from Article III, to limit federal court jurisdiction and leave areas of law to resolution in state courts. Yet this power is only the power to make "exceptions," which necessarily implies a counteracting and supreme principle that must remain. 76 This leads to the second proposition that the framers intended the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, to have an essential role under the constitutional plan in reviewing important national issues. 77 These two propositions roughly equate to the ideologies of modern federalism and nationalism, respectively, and an inquiry into judicial federalism, as it applies to the jurisdictionstripping debate, is instructive.
II. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
A. The Federalist and Nationalist Viewpoints
Professor Fallon has identified two models of judicial federalism that generally explain two common categories of competing constitutional theories: a federalist model and a nationalist model. 78 The federalist model, which is most dominant in current Supreme Court cases, views the states as important entities of government and emphasizes that state courts are "constitutionally as competent as federal courts to adjudicate federal issues and to award remedies necessary to 75 Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1609-10. 76 The nationalist model, as identified by Professor Fallon, finds a "strong conception of national supremacy" embodied in the Constitution and views the Constitution as "contemplat[ing] a special role for the federal judiciary, different in kind from that assigned to state courts, in ensuring the supremacy of national authority."
83 Nationalists therefore view federal courts as more competent and effective than state courts in enforcing constitutional rights. 84 It is this view that won the day in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, as a majority of the Court reaffirmed continued adherence to traditional Young doctrine, "acknowl- 79 Id. at 1153 (emphasis omitted). 80 Id. at 1154 (emphasis omitted). 81 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) 82 Id. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). Justice Kennedy went on to write:
It is the right and duty of the States, within their own judiciaries, to interpret and to follow the Constitution and all laws enacted pursuant to it, subject to a litigant's right of review in this Court in a proper case. The Constitution and laws of the United States are not a body of law external to the States, acknowledged and enforced simply as a matter of comity. The Constitution is the basic law of the Nation, a law to which a State's ties are no less intimate than those of the National Government itself. . . . It would be error coupled with irony were we to bypass the Eleventh Amendment, which enacts a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole rationale that state courts are inadequate to enforce and interpret federal rights in every case. Id. at 275-76. Justice Kennedy sought to narrow the Young exception by requiring a case-by-case analysis of factors including whether applying the exception would "'upset the balance of federal and state interests that it embodies.'" Id. at 277 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)). 83 Fallon, supra note 17, at 1158-59 (emphasis omitted). 84 See id. at 1161 (describing factors which contribute to federal courts' arguably more effective protection of federal rights).
edg[ing] the importance of having federal courts open to enforce and interpret federal rights." 85
These countervailing views of judicial federalism are strongly at play in two areas of constitutional debate relevant here: Congress's power to curtail federal court jurisdiction 86 and state sovereign immunity. 87 An inquiry into the latter provides a great deal of insight into the former.
B. Sovereign Immunity and Ex parte Young
A majority of the current Supreme Court firmly upholds a broad view of state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits. While the validity of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence is outside the scope of this Comment and is already the subject of much scholarly analysis, 88 a brief overview of sovereign immunity law as it stands today is appropriate. Historically, the Court has found state sovereign immunity to be rooted in the Eleventh Amendment, which dictates: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 89 The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in response to the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 90 which held that Article III of the Constitution, by extending to the judiciary the power to hear controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State," allowed not only suits by the states against those citizens, but also suits against the states by those citizens. 91 The Eleventh Amendment, by its text, explicitly bars the latter.
Almost against a state brought by its own citizens. 93 The decision in Hans provided the starting point for the Court's current sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The Court in recent years has significantly broadened the scope of its sovereign immunity interpretation, holding that state sovereign immunity was not derived from the Eleventh Amendment, but rather was a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty possessed by the states before the Constitution was ratified and preserved by the Constitution through its federal structure. 94 Rather than establishing state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment merely clarified the Constitution and rectified Chisholm's error by restoring the Constitution's true meaning-that the states retain "'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty'" essential to their dignity within the federalist system. 95 Thus, the Court's sovereign immunity law, as it stands today, is strongly rooted in concerns of federalism and the dignity of the states.
A serious consequence arises if sovereign immunity were to protect states from all private lawsuits, in that individuals would be rendered unable to sue states to prevent violations of the Constitution and federal law. However, several methods exist to avoid this harsh result. The first is state consent to suit-that is, a state can waive its sovereign immunity and allow individuals to sue in state or federal court.
96 Also, the Court has held that Congress can abrogate the sovereign immunity of states when acting appropriately under power granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 Finally, the Court has established an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine based on the case of Ex parte Young. 98 It is this last method that is of particular relevance to the issue of jurisdiction stripping.
The Court in Young established the principle that, although a suit against a state might be barred by sovereign immunity, an individual may sue state officials in their official capacity to prevent a violation of 93 The Court in Pennhurst described Young's intersection with its sovereign immunity jurisprudence as a balancing of interests-"'the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution. '" 110 In determining that the Young exception did not apply in a state-law suit, the Pennhurst Court illustrated this balancing structure by weighing state sovereignty interests against the federal supremacy interest. The Court pointed out that when a state official is alleged to violate state law, "the entire basis for the doctrine of Young . . . disappears" because a grant of relief from a violation of state law "does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law."
111 The Court, therefore, has looked to the extent of the federal supremacy interest implicated in determining whether concerns of federalism are outweighed when applying the Young exception to sovereign immunity. lenge the validity of this "obvious fiction," 113 there are at least two possible explanations. The first is that the Young doctrine is rooted in and required by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; the Court essentially said as much in Green and Pennhurst. 114 Alternatively, the Young exception might be part of a broader mode of constitutional interpretation of jurisdiction that looks to the importance of the merits of the claim rather than solely the statutory basis for jurisdictionan extraconstitutional tradition rooted in courts' historical equity powers.
115
Professor Laura Fitzgerald has argued that, although the Supreme Court has conventionally required that subject matter jurisdiction be a prerequisite for the exercise of Article III judicial power, 116 in several significant cases the Court has exchanged this "jurisdiction-first view for a more malleable approach that dispenses federal judicial power based on how important the Court considers the federal interests at stake, on the merits, and how necessary the Court considers it to provide a federal remedy where those interests are impaired."
117
According to Fitzgerald, "[t]his merits-first tendency has led the Court to claim the judicial power to act even where constitutional or statutory obstacles seriously compromise subject matter jurisdiction."
118 As a central example of this merits-first trend, Fitzgerald points to sovereign immunity cases and argues that, although most are driven by a jurisdiction-first analysis, the Court's preservation of the Young exception is a merits-based effort to vindicate federal rights.
119
Whether Professor Fitzgerald is correct that Young falls within a distinct merits-first analysis or whether Young is rooted in the constitutional Supremacy Clause, the Court has consistently held that the 113 Id. at 270; supra note 101. 114 See supra notes 108, 110-11 and accompanying text. 115 See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2001) ("When the Supreme Court disregards its jurisdiction-first rhetoric and instead dispenses federal judicial power based on how important it considers the federal interests at stake, on the merits, the Court acts like a pre-constitutional court of equitynot the creature of a limited and limiting Article III."). 116 See id. at 1207, 1214-16 ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 514 (1869))). 117 Id. at 1207. 118 Id. 119 See id. at 1220 (" [T] he Court continues to defend and preserve Young based simply on the compelling need to have federal courts open to enforce federal law against recalcitrant states, despite the limit on the federal judicial power that state sovereign immunity has been held to impose.").
Young exception is primarily based on maintaining important federal government interests despite an apparent jurisdictional bar to suit. Similar interests apply when the jurisdictional bar is based not on sovereign immunity but rather congressional jurisdictional restrictions under Article III.
III. FEDERAL COURTS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, AND FEDERALISM: A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW
The "essential functions" view of federal court jurisdiction, as previously posited, 120 was flawed because it tried to do too much while failing to adequately ground itself in a strongly supportive textual theory of the Constitution. But a narrowed version of the "essential functions" theory, focusing on the Supremacy Clause yet integrating concerns of federalism, might more appropriately represent the text of the Constitution, the views of the framers, and the historical applications thereafter in laws such as the 1789 Judiciary Act. It would also avoid Professor Amar's criticism of the "essential functions" theory as 
A. Constitutional Supremacy
In considering a constitutional supremacy theory of jurisdiction, it is important to first recognize that the Supremacy Clause does not establish a monolithic "federal supremacy" interest; rather, the Constitution sets up a textual hierarchy that entrenches itself at the top: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ."
122
The Constitution is absolutely supreme; congressional laws only share in that supremacy when they comport with the Constitution. 123 While this is seemingly self-evident, the Supremacy Clause sets up a hierarchy with the Constitution above federal laws and holding that this confirms and strengthens the principle that "a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that it clarifies that the general "federal supremacy" interest can only be challenged in two ways relevant to this discussion: when a federal law is alleged to violate the Constitution (thereby threatening the supremacy of the Constitution) and when a state law is alleged to violate the Constitution or conflict with a federal statute (thereby threatening the supremacy of either the Constitution or the federal law, respectively). As the Supreme Court is "the constitutional instrument for implementing the supremacy clause" 124 -or at the very least, the Court has recognized in the Young line of cases that some federal forum is necessary to vindicate the Supremacy Clause 125 -a jurisdictional theory integrating the concerns of the Supremacy Clause provides a textual basis for an argument that constitutional supremacy places a necessary limit on Congress's power to curtail federal court jurisdiction.
126
Proponents of the "essential functions" theory err when interpreting the federal supremacy interest by failing to limit themselves to the preceding self-evident proposition, often basing their arguments in the general structure of government 127 or a broad view of "federal su- Because the Constitution is supreme over federal statutes, there is a fundamental difference between nonconstitutional federal claims, which merely seek a remedy under federal statutes, and constitutional claims, which seek to vindicate constitutional rights, in that the supremacy of the Constitution is only threatened in the latter instance.
Nonconstitutional federal claims seek a remedy under federal statutes and in the process clarify the meaning of those statutes. There is no real harm done to the federal supremacy of federal law when Congress expressly and exclusively delegates those interpretive determinations to state courts, even if there is no federal court review of their decisions. 129 Congress need not make a particular law at all and need not even create inferior federal courts to hear a claim under a particular law, and the Supreme Court has firmly established that the framers of the Constitution trusted state courts to interpret federal law competently. Because Congress has the power to define inferior federal court jurisdiction, Congress can, in effect, delegate entire areas of federal law for exclusive state interpretation and application. 130 the life tenure provision and salary diminution prohibition, id. at 63-65, to find an implied requirement of federal court jurisdiction.
128 Professor Ratner views the Supremacy Clause as mandating "that there shall be one supreme federal law throughout the land," and did not distinguish between constitutional claims and nonconstitutional claims. Ratner, supra note 8, at 160. Professor Sager does recognize the distinct importance of Supreme Court review for constitutional claims but never explained why he was distinguishing between constitutional claims and nonconstitutional federal claims for purposes of federal supremacy. In fact, it is never clear that he truly distinguishes between the two, as he refers several times to mandatory federal review of state compliance with "federal law," not just constitutional law. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 4, at 57. Nevertheless, as Professor Redish points out, Sager's reliance on a general idea of federal supremacy, as he analyzes it, could not logically be limited to constitutional claims because the Supremacy Clause "is not limited in its dictates to matters of constitutional law." Redish, supra note 42, at 148. 129 One might respond that Congress cannot authorize the state courts to raise state law above federal law, as this would directly violate the Supremacy Clause. However, there is a difference between allowing state law to trump federal law and allowing states courts to interpret federal law. By deferring to state courts the interpretation of federal laws, Congress would effectively be saying that state courts are competent to be the exclusive interpreters of its laws. In doing so, Congress is taking the risk that state courts would misconstrue its intent, but it is a risk that Congress is explicitly assuming. 130 Amar argues that the mandatory nature of Article III jurisdiction means that the government cannot do this, but this assumes Article III is indeed fully mandatory per his textual argument, not that it conflicts with a theory of constitutional supremacy. See Amar, supra note 44, at 251 n.150. If Amar's mandatory argument were adopted, it would subsume the constitutional supremacy theory posed here; were it not adopted, the argument here survives independently. Amar also contends that a coextensiveness principle requires that national judges expound congressional laws, argu-This analysis follows the balancing structure set up in the Young line of cases. 134 In the same way that the Pennhurst Court weighed the state sovereignty interests of the Eleventh Amendment against the interest in federal supremacy rooted in the Supremacy Clause, 135 it is logical that the Court, if reviewing a jurisdiction-stripping proposal, could weigh Congress's Article III power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction against the interest in federal supremacy rooted in the Supremacy Clause. Just as the Pennhurst Court found that violation of state law by state officials presented no threat to federal supremacy, 136 a weighing of a congressional jurisdiction-stripping proposal would yield an analogous result. Insofar as the proposal applies to nonconstitutional issues of federal law, it would present no threat to federal supremacy because Congress would be voluntarily foregoing federal court interpretation of its own laws; however, insofar as the proposal applies to constitutional issues, the proposal would present a strong threat to constitutional supremacy because congressional desire to confine resolution of constitutional issues to state courts does nothing to vitiate the important supremacy interest, upheld in the Young line of cases, in having federal courts available as the ultimate interpreters of those issues.
B. Historical Support
Not only does this theory comport with the underpinnings of the Young line of cases, it upholds the ideas and assumptions of the framers, who seemingly believed that important national issues would be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 137 A constitutional supremacy theory of federal jurisdiction also avoids the historical pitfalls of other approaches that are "done in" by section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 138 The Act did not allow appeals of state court decisions in favor of federal rights-yet these are precisely the types of cases that present no challenge to federal supremacy. 139 If the state court is favoring a federal or constitutional right, it is actually overprotecting federal law. While there may be minor gaps between the Act of 1789 and a theory that would prevent Congress from restricting Supreme Court appellate review of constitutional cases, 140 "section 25 of the Act . . . was essentially a supremacy-assuring device." 141 137 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74. 138 Professor Redish's critique of similar arguments made by Professor Sager does not apply here, due to the differences between this theory and Sager's. As Redish notes, Sager's theory, though concerned with federal supremacy, was fundamentally based on the text of Article III alone, in particular the salary and tenure provisions. See Redish, supra note 42, at 144-45. In response to Sager's argument that Congress must use the federal courts to ensure that state courts were complying with federal law, Redish points out that "there is, by definition, no possibility of interference with federal supremacy [because] the federal government has chosen to deem acceptable whatever constructions of federal law the state courts develop." Id. at 147. While this is correct as applied to nonconstitutional interpretations of federal law by state courts, as reflected in Sager's theory, it is incorrect as applied to constitutional interpretations by state courts, to which the constitutional supremacy theory posited here is limited. In that Congress is subordinate to the supreme Constitution in the legal hierarchy, they do not have the same leeway to delegate interpretive authority. Redish also argues that there is no way to limit Sager's logic to constitutional cases, as the federal supremacy interest would seemingly require federal courts to police state courts on all issues of federal law because " [t] he supremacy clause, it should be recalled, is not limited in its dictates to matters of constitutional law, much less of constitutional right." Id. at 148. This argument is directly addressed in this Comment by noting that the Supremacy Clause does make an essential distinction between constitutional and federal law. See, e.g., supra Part III.A. Finally, Redish responds to Sager's reliance on the Article III salary and tenure provision, which is not addressed in this Comment. Id. at 149.
139 See Ratner, supra note 8, at 185-86 ("A state court decision upholding a right claimed under a federal statute does not challenge the supremacy of federal law."). 140 Even if gaps exist, they are not necessarily fatal to a theory that would place some limits on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power. First, while "tradition treats the constitutional views of members of the first Congress as entitled to great respect," the Judiciary Act is merely persuasive evidence of the constitutional framers' intent, and it is possible that those enacting the Act misunderstood the import of particular phrases of constitutional text. Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1610; see also Amar, supra note 10, at 1541 ("The political safeguards principle is a constant reminder that even the It also comports with the text of Article III, which gives Congress only the power to make exceptions; it "implies a minor deviation from a surviving norm,"
142 not an exception that swallows the rule. Professor Sager was correct in arguing that "the essential function claim is strongest when narrowed to Supreme Court review of state court decisions that repudiate federal constitutional claims of right," 143 though he proffered a more expansive argument himself. And the evidence supporting the framers' intention to ensure that an independent federal judiciary preserve federal supremacy remains persuasive. 144 There is also evidence tending to establish a direct connection between the text of the Supremacy Clause and Article III, implying that the framers intended the federal judiciary to be the final arbiters of constitutional law. It is no accident that there is a striking similarity between the text of the Supremacy Clause, which makes supreme "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,"
145 and the first line of Article III, Section 2, which says that the federal judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under "this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." 146 The initial draft of the Supremacy Clause included a specified role for the federal judiciary and referred only to violations of the Constitution, not federal law, stating: "All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall be supreme law of the land, and that the Judicial Power of the [United States] shall extend to all cases arising under them . . . .
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This provides further support for the theory that the Supremacy Clause was intended to ensure federal court jurisdiction over constitutional cases as a last resort.
It is important to note that a constitutional supremacy theory of federal court jurisdiction does not necessarily require that the Supreme Court be the court to ensure constitutional supremacy. While many scholars make persuasive arguments that the Court was intended to serve this purpose, 153 there is evidence that Congress could designate inferior federal courts as the final arbiters of particular issues and still serve the demands of constitutional supremacy. 154 Regardless of how that particular argument is ultimately decided, Supreme Court precedent upholds the importance of having some federal forum to vindicate the Supremacy Clause.
C. Applicability to Current and Future Proposals
The application of a constitutional supremacy theory to the two recently proposed congressional jurisdiction-stripping bills would be positively received by those who favor federal review of the important constitutional issues involved. The Marriage Protection Act seeks to evade federal court review of the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, under the theory posed here, any challenges to a state's nonrecognition of a same-sex marriage sanctioned by another state would have the chance to be reviewed, ultimately, by the Supreme Court. Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution is, by its very nature, a rule intended to create uniformity between the states and a rule which states have differing interests in construing under particular interpretations, it is all the 152 more important to secure a federal forum to interpret the supreme law of the Constitution. Similarly, the sheer national importance of interpretation of the Establishment Clause weighs against allowing state courts to have the last word with regard to the "Pledge Protection Act." Regardless of how the Supreme Court would actually rule in these cases, recognizing an irreducible federal court power to review constitutional cases would prevent such a result, maintaining flexibility for implementation of federalist interests while preserving ultimate vindication of nationalist principles.
Establishing that, at a minimum, federal court review of state constitutional rulings is mandatory would also have broader implications in discouraging ill-motivated jurisdiction-stripping proposals in general. Because the purpose of many of these bills is to overturn or evade Supreme Court rulings, the heart would be cut out of these proposals, and congressional control of federal jurisdiction, while still extensive, would be essentially limited to dividing classes of cases between the courts for procedural reasons. Though Congress could still limit original litigation of substantive constitutional legal issues to state courts, the political value of such a limitation would be greatly diminished because the Supreme Court would still have the ability to speak the last word.
CONCLUSION
A theory of constitutional supremacy as a limiting factor on Congress's jurisdiction-stripping power is a strong starting point for those who seek to balance the nationalist and federalist concerns at the heart of this debate. It recognizes that the Constitution's framers believed in the state courts' competency to hear issues of federal and constitutional law, but that they also believed a federal forum for appeals was necessary to uphold the principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause. When balancing the two concerns, it is evident that even if the Supremacy Clause is not violated when Congress voluntarily relinquishes its interest in federal court interpretation of its laws in a nonconstitutional sense, the Supremacy Clause is violated when Congress attempts to remove federal court appellate review of constitutional issues. Recognizing this consequence would prevent some of the more egregious attempts by Congress to reverse or evade Supreme Court constitutional precedents by curtailing jurisdiction, but allow Congress to use the state courts as full participants in the adjudication of federal and constitutional law, as the Madisonian Compromise intended.
